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WHAT PRICE THE BAR? EXAMINING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE VIRGINIA BAR
ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS IN FRIEDMAN V.
SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
The privileges and immunities clause in article IV of the United States
Constitution ("privileges and immunities clause") guarantees citizens of
each state the right to enjoy the privileges and immunities of citizens in all
other states.' In determining the clause's scope of protection, the United
States Supreme Court continuously has attempted to define the rights that
the privileges and immunities clause guarantees to state citizens. 2 Recently,

1. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. The United States Supreme Court has determined

that the term "citizen" in article IV of the United States Constitution generally is interchangeable with the term "resident." Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 n.8 (1978). A person
that is not a citizen of the United States, however, may not claim the protection of the
privileges and immunities clause in article IV (privileges and immunities clause). See R.
ROTUNDA, J. NowAK, & J. YOUNG, TR.ATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 12.7, at 649 (1986) (privileges and immunities clause protects only United States
citizens). A corporation is not a citizen of the United States under the privileges and immunities
clause. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 181 (1868). Additionally, the privileges and

immunities clause does not protect resident aliens. See R. ROTUNDA, J. NowAK, & J. YOUNG,
supra, § 12.7, at 650 n.13 (privileges and immunities clause does not protect noncitizen
residents). Resident aliens, however, may derive comparable protection from the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. See id. (fourteenth
amendment limits citizenship classifications that burden resident aliens).
2. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) (privileges
and immunities clause protects fundamental privileges and immunities that citizens living under
free governments traditionally have enjoyed); C. GERSTENBERG, AM ERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: TExT AND LEADING CAsrs 55 (1941) (courts have defined scope of privileges and
immunities clause protection on case-by-case basis). Courts have determined that the privileges
and immunities clause guarantees nonresidents of a state several rights. C. GERSTENBERO,
supra, at 55. The privileges and immunities clause protects a nonresident's right to government
protection and right to acquire and possess property. Id. Additionally, the privileges and
immunities clause guarantees a nonresident's right to pass through or reside in any other state
for trade, agriculture, or professional pursuits, a nonresident's right of habeas corpus, and a
nonresident's right to bring an action of any kind in another state's courts. Id. In addition,
the privileges and immunities clause protects a nonresident's right to take, hold, and dispose
of real or personal property. Id. at 56.
Although courts have determined that the privileges and immunities clause protects the
fundamental rights of citizens living under free governments, the "fundamental rights" that
the privileges and immunities clause guarantees are broader in scope than the fundamental
rights that the due process and equal protection clauses protect. R. ROTUNDA, J. NowAK, &
J. YOUNG, supra note 1, § 12.7, at 651. Fundamental rights under the due process and equal
protection clauses, such as the right to vote and the right to travel, always compel strict
judicial scrutiny of government regulation, but a court will uphold under the privileges and
immunities clause any right that affects the general well-being of all the nation's citizens.
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978). For example, the
Supreme Court has determined that, because private sector employment is essential to the
economic vitality of the nation, the privileges and immunities clause protects private sector
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in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper the United States Supreme
Court determined that the privileges and immunities clause protects the
privilege of practicing law.4 The Supreme Court in Piper reasoned that,
absent substantial justification, a state- rule requiring all members of the
state bar to reside in the state deprived nonresident lawyers of the privilege
of practicing law in the state on the same terms as residents of the state.5
The Supreme Court held that a state rule requiring state residency violates
the privileges and immunities clause. 6 Although the Supreme Court has
determined that the privileges and immunities clause protects the privilege
of practicing law, the Supreme Court has not determined whether a state
rule that prohibits nonresidents from gaining admission to a state bar
without taking the state bar examination ("admission on motion") violates
the privileges and immunities clause. In Friedman v. Supreme Court of
Virginia the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a state rule that prohibits nonresidents from gaining admission
to a state bar on motion violates the privileges and immunities clause."
In Friedman the plaintiff, Myrna E. Friedman, was a member of the
District of Columbia bar who, while living in Virginia, had practiced law
in the District of Columbia. 9 In January 1986, however, Ms. Friedman
accepted a position as Associate General Counsel for a Virginia corporation.10 While working for the Virginia corporation, she married and moved
to Maryland, which was her husband's home." Subsequently, Ms. Friedman
employment. United Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208,
222 (1984). The regulation of private employment, however, does not violate a fundamental
right that the due process or equal protection clauses guarantee. R. ROTUNDA, J. NowAK, &
J. YOUNG, supra note 1, § 12.7, at 651.
3. 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
4. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 279-83 (1985). In Supreme Court
of New Hampshire v. Piper the United States Supreme Court recognized that the practice of
law is vital to the national economy. Id. at 281; see infra notes 20, 28, 31-33 and accompanying
text (discussing Friedman court's treatment of Piper); infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text
(discussing Supreme Court's reasoning and holding in Piper).
5. See Piper, 470 U.S. at 288 (because New Hampshire failed to show substantial
reasons for discriminating against nonresidents and substantial relationship between discrimination and reasons for discrimination, New Hampshire rule violated privileges and immunities
clause); see infra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing Piper's two-part privileges and
immunities clause analysis). In Piper the complaint alleged that, under the privileges and
immunities clause, Rule 42 of the New Hampshire Supreme Court was unconstitutional. Piper,
470 U.S. at 276-77. The plaintiff claimed that the rule was unconstitutional because the rule
required applicants to the New Hampshire state bar either to reside in New Hampshire or to
file a statement of intent to become a New Hampshire resident. Id., n.1.
6. Piper, 470 U.S. at 288.
7. 822 F.2d 423 (4th Cir.), prob. juris. noted, 108 S. Ct. 283 (1987).
8. Friedman v. Supreme Court of Va., 822 F.2d 423, 424 (4th Cir. 1987).
9. Id.
10. Id. In Friedman Ms. Friedman, in January 1986, became Associate General Counsel
for ERC International, Inc. in Vienna, Virginia. Id. When Ms. Friedman began working in
Vienna, Ms. Friedman resided in Arlington, Virginia. Id.
11. Id. In Friedman Ms. Friedman applied to the Virginia bar in June 1986 after moving
to Maryland with her husband. Id.
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applied to the Supreme Court for the commonwealth of Virginia for
admission on motion to the Virginia bar.'2 Under Rule 1A:I(c) of the
Virginia Supreme Court ("Rule 1A:I(c)"), however, an attorney who applies
to the Virginia bar for admission on motion must be a permanent resident
of the commonwealth of Virginia. 3 The Virginia Supreme Court ("Virginia") denied Ms. Friedman's application for admission on motion because
4
Ms. Friedman did not meet the residency requirement of Rule 1A:1(c).'
After Virginia denied Ms. Friedman's application for admission on
motion, Ms. Friedman commenced an action against Virginia under section
1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, claiming that Rule 1A:I(c) of
the Virginia bar admission requirements violated the privileges and immunities clause.' 5 The district court determined that Rule 1A:1(c) violates the
privileges and immunities clause because Rule 1A:l(c) creates an intolerable
burden on a nonresident's privilege of practicing law in Virginia.' 6 The

12. Id.
13. Va. Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule IA:l(c); see Friedman v. Supreme Court of Va., 822 F.2d
423, 424 n.1 (4th Cir. 1987) (reprinting and discussing elements of Virginia Rule IA:1)..
14. Friedman, 822 F.2d at 424. Virginia Supreme Court Rule lA:I allows an applicant
to the Virginia bar to be admitted to the state bar on motion if the applicant follows certain
procedural rules. Id.; Va. Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule IA:I. In addition, the Supreme Court of
Virginia must decide that the applicant morally is suitable to practice law; that the applicant
has gained enough experience practicing law that requiring the applicant to take the bar
examination would be unreasonable; that the applicant has become a permanent resident of
Virginia ("Rule 1A:I(c)"); and that the applicant will practice full-time as a member of the
Virginia bar ("Rule 1A:1(d)"). Va. Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule 1A:I; see Friedman, 822 F.2d at
424-25 n.1 (4th Cir. 1987) (reprinting and discussing elements of Rule 1A:l).
Several courts that have considered the constitutionality of Rule 1A:I of the Virginia
Supreme Court Rules have established that the rule serves a valid state purpose and does not
violate either the due process clause or the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.
See Goldfarb v. Supreme Court of Va., 766 F.2d 859, 865 (4th Cir. 1985) (rejecting challenge
to Rule IA:l(d) on commerce clause grounds), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1086 (1986); Brown v.
Supreme Court of Va., 359 F. Supp. 549, 562 (E.D. Va. 1973) (rejecting equal protection
challenge to Rule 1A:1 of Virginia Supreme Court Rules), aff'd mem. 414 U.S. 1034 (1973);
In re Brown, 213 Va. 282, 284, 191 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1972) (Rule 1A:l(d) validly requires
applicant that wants to practice law in Virginia to maintain office in Virginia and regularly
to practice law in Virginia). The Supreme Court's decision in Piper made more promising the
prospects for a privileges and immunities challenge to Rule lA:l because Piper established
that the privileges and immunities clause protects the practice of law. See Supreme Court of
N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 281 (1985) (practice of law falls within scope of privileges and
immunities clause); Note, A Constitutional Analysis of State Bar Residency Requirements
under the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 92 HAv. L. REv. 1461,
1464 (1979) (although equal protection doctrine did not provide feasible basis for challenge to
bar residency requirements, privileges and immunities clause offers strong basis on which to
challenge residency rules).
15. Friedman, 822 F.2d at 424. In Friedman Ms. Friedman filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and requested the court to declare invalid
Rule IA:l(c). Id.
16. See id. at 425 (discussing district court's holding in Friedman). The district court
in Friedmandetermined that Rule IA:1(c) impermissibly interferes with a nonresident attorney's
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district court. therefore, entered summary judgment for Ms. Friedman. 17
Virginia appealed the district court's decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.' 8
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered whether Rule 1A:1(c) violates
the protection that the privileges and immunities clause affords those who
practice law.19 In considering Rule 1A:1(c), the Fourth Circuit initially
recognized that the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that the privileges
and immunities clause protects the privilege of practicing law. 20 The Friedman court, furthermore, rejected Virginia's argument that the Supreme
Court never has recognized that citizens have a fundamental right to practice
law without taking a bar examination. 2' The Fourth Circuit, in rejecting
Virginia's argument, reasoned that the Supreme Court has not limited the
protection of the privileges and immunities clause to those rights that the
Supreme Court has declared fundamental under the fourteenth amendment. 22
The Friedman court recognized that the U.S. Supreme Court has granted
privileges and immunities clause protection to several economic interests
23
that are not fundamental rights that the fourteenth amendment protects.

privilege to practice law because, although attorneys that reside in Virginia enjoy the privilege
of becoming members of the Virginia bar on motion, nonresident attorneys must take the bar
examination to obtain membership in the Virginia bar. Id.
17. See id. at 424 (discussing district court's holding in Friedman).
18. Id. at 425.
19. Id.

20. Id. The Friedman court, in determining that the privileges and immunities clause
protects an individual's right to practice law, emphasized that the United States Supreme Court
has ruled that the privileges and immunities clause protects more than the fundamental rights
that the fourteenth amendment guarantees. Id. at 426. The Friedman court, for example,
recognized that the privileges and immunities clause guarantees nonresidents of a state the
right to do business within that state on the same terms as the citizens of that state. Id.; see
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948) (privileges and immunities clause guarantees
nonresidents of state privilege of doing business on terms of substantial equality with residents
of that state). Citing Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper the Friedman court reasoned

that legal practice is important to the national economy and furthers the goal of the framers
of the Constitution to fuse the states into a compatible federal union. Friedman, 822 F.2d at
426; see Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 281-82 (1985) (lawyers play valuable
role in nation's economy and valuable noneconomic role in representing persons with unpopular
claims); see Toomer, 334 U.S. at 395 (framers of privileges and immunities clause intended to
fuse sovereign states into one nation).
21. Friedman, 822 F.2d at 425. In Friedman Virginia relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in Leis v. Flynt to support its argument that the United States Constitution guarantees
no fundamental right to practice law without taking a bar examination. Id.; see Leis v. Flynt,
439 U.S. 438, 438 (1979) (due process clause of fourteenth amendment does not give nonresident
lawyer right to appear before state's courts for particular case without ttaking state's bar
examination).
22. See Friedman, 822 F.2d at 426 (determining that Supreme Court has applied privileges
and immunities clause protection to several rights that are not "fundamental" under fourteenth
amendment).
23. Id. In recognizing that the U.S. Supreme Court has extended the scope of priviriges
and immunities clause protection beyond the scope of fundamental rights under the fourteenth
amendment, the Fourth Circuit in Friedman cited Hicklin v. Orbeck, Toomer v. Witsell, and
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The Friedman court also recognized that, although the right to practice law
privileges
is not fundamental, the U.S. Supreme Court in Piper extended
24
and immunities clause protection to the right to practice law.
After recognizing that the privileges and immunities clause protects a
citizen's privilege to practice law without taking a bar examination, the
Friedman court considered whether Rule 1A:1(c) violates the protection that
the privileges and immunities clause affords those who practice law. 2 In
analyzing the effects of Rule 1A:l(c), the Friedman court first determined
that applying Rule 1A:1(c) to nonresident attorneys results in discriminatory
treatment of nonresident attorneys. 26 The Friedman court reasoned that Rule
1A:1(c) requires nonresidents, but not residents, to pay a bar examination
fee, to prepare for a bar examination, to expect a period of delay before
admission to the bar that adversely may affect an applicant's legal practice,
and to risk failing the bar examination. 27 In addition, the Friedman court
reasoned that Rule 1A:l(c)'s residency requirement discourages nonresident
attorneys from professionally competing with Virginia attorneys and induces
nonresidents to purchase homes in Virginia. 28 The Fourth Circuit determined
that Rule lA:1(c) is facially discriminatory because the rule prohibits nonresidents that wish to practice law in Virginia from practicing without taking
the bar examination, but does not prohibit Virginia residents from practicing
without taking the bar examination. 29 The Friedman court reasoned that,
because of the facially discriminatory nature of Rule 1A:l(c), the rule

Ward v. Maryland. Id.; see Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 (1978) (privileges and
immunities clause protects nonresident of state's right to pursue "common calling" in that
state); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403 (1948) (privileges and immunities clause protects
commercial shrimping in marginal sea); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871)
(privileges and immunities clause protects rights of citizen of one state to engage in any lawful
commerce, trade, or business in another state).
24. Friedman, 822 F.2d at 426; see Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 28081 (1985) (to hold that privileges and immunities clause protects practice of law is consistent
with holdings in Ward, Toomer, and Hicklin).
25. Friedman, 822 F.2d at 426-30.
26. Id. at 427.
27. Id. After recognizing that Rule 1A:l(c) placed additional burdens on nonresident
attorneys, the Friedman court concluded that the combined effect of Rule IA:l(c)'s burdens
on nonresident attorneys is to deter attorneys from practicing in Virginia. Id.
28. Id. In recognizing that Rule IA:I(c) discourages nonresident attorneys from professionally competing with Virginia attorneys, the Friedman court suggested that Virginia may
have enacted Rule IA:l(c) to protect the Virginia economy, which is a state justification for
discrimination against nonresidents that the Supreme Court has rejected. See id. at 427 n.5
(discussing Supreme Court's reference in Piper to state rules that protect resident lawyers from
professional competition of nonresident lawyers); Piper, 470 U.S. at 285 n.18 (economic
protectionism is not substantial reason for state discrimination against nonresident attorneys).
29. Friedman, 822 F.2d at 426-27. The Friedman court suggested that, although Rule
lA:I as a whole may have discriminatory effects on resident lawyers practicing in Virginia,
paragraph (c) of Rule 1A:I, which Ms. Friedman challenged, only discriminates against
nonresidents. Id. The Friedman court determined that the effect of other provisions of Rule
1A:1 on Virginia residents does not alter Rule IA:1(c)'s facial discrimination against nonresidents. Id.
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became subject to scrutiny under the privileges and immunities clause.301n
a two-part privileges and immunities clause analysis of Rule 1A:I(c), the
Friedman court first explained that, despite the rule's discriminatory effects,
Rule 1A:l(c) could withstand privileges and immunities clause scrutiny if
Virginia could show a substantial state reason for Rule 1A:l(c)'s disparity
in treatment between resident and nonresident attorneys. 3' In response,
Virginia suggested that the goal of improving the quality of Virginia lawyers

justifies requirement of a bar examination for all nonresident attorneys
seeking to practice in Virginia. 32 Addressing Virginia's argument, however,
the Friedman court found no relation between state residence and attorney
competence. 33 Additionally, Virginia cited Rule 1A:l(d) of the Virginia

Supreme Court Rules (Rule 1A:l(d)), which requires attorneys applying for
admission on motion to establish a full-time practice in Virginia, as a

substantial state reason for discrimination against nonresident attorneys.3 4
Virginia argued that requiring residency under Rule 1A:1(c) facilitates com-

pliance with Rule 1A:l(d), because a resident of Virginia would be more
likely than a nonresident of Virginia to commit to a full-time practice in
the state. 35 The Friedman court, however, reasoned that the presumption
that a Virginia resident attorney is more likely to honor his vow to practice
law full-time in Virginia than a nonresident is insupportable.3 6 The Fourth

30. Id. at 426. In questioning whether Rule IA:I(c) was subject to the privileges and
immunities clause, the Fourth Circuit in Friedman determined that the commonwealth of
Virginia, by enacting Rule IA:l(c), chose to discriminate against nonresidents of Virginia. Id.
The Friedman court concluded that, because of the rule's facial discrimination and the
disproportionate burden that the rule's discrimination places on nonresidents, Rule 1A:I(c)
falls within the scope of the privileges and immunities clause. Id.
31. Id. at 428. The Friedmancourt relied on the United States Supreme Court's decisions
in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper and United Building and Construction Trades
Council v. Mayor of Camden in applying the Friedman court's two-part analysis of the
privileges and immunities clause. Id.; see Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288
(1985) (state may discriminate against nonresidents only if state can show substantial reasons
for discrimination and substantial relationship between state's reasons and discrimination);
United Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 218 (1984)
(same); see also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948) (in examining cases under
privileges and immunities clause, courts should inquire whether valid independent reasons for
discrimination exist and whether discrimination bears close relationship to reasons for discrimination).
32. Friedman, 822 F.2d at 428.
33. Id. at 429. In a footnote to its opinion, the Friedman court adopted the Supreme
Court's conclusion in Piper that no relationship exists between a lawyer's residence in a state
and lawyer competence. Id. at 429 n.6. The Friedman court also noted that Virginia suggested
no connection between a lawyer's residence in the state and a lawyer's competence. Id. The
Friedman court concluded, therefore, that Virginia cannot impose "quality control" over its
attorneys by restricting the ability of nonresidents of Virginia to practice law within Virginia's
borders. Id. at 429.
34. Id. at 429; see Va. Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule IA:l(d) (requiring applicants for admission
on motion to establish full-time practice in Virginia).
35. Friedman, 822 F.2d at 429.
36. Id. at 429. The Friedman court could find no evidence to support a conclusion that
a Virginia nonresident would be less truthful than a Virginia resident in establishing an
intention to practice full-time in Virginia. Id.
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Circuit determined that, because Virginia offered no evidence supporting
Virginia's theory, the goal of attorney commitment7 to full-time practice
does not justify discrimination against nonresidents.1
After determining that Virginia demonstrated no substantial reason for
discriminating against nonresident attorneys, the Friedman court addressed
the second prong of its privileges and immunities clause analysis. 3s According
to the Fourth Circuit, the second prong of privileges and immunities clause
scrutiny requires a state to establish a substantial relationship between the
state's goals in discriminating against nonresidents and the effects of the
state's discrimination against nonresidents. 39 The Friedman court suggested
that, in considering whether a state has demonstrated a substantial relationship between the state's objectives in regulating the practice of law and the
state's discrimination against nonresidents, courts may consider less restrictive means available to the state for accomplishing the same objectives.The Friedman court, therefore, considered whether Virginia could adopt
less restrictive means than a residency requirement for admission on motion
to accomplish its goal of a competent and committed bar.4' The Fourth
Circuit suggested that the state might require members of the bar to renew
their commitments to practice full-time in Virginia each year. 42 The Friedman
court also suggested that a full-time practice requirement, like the full-time
practice requirement in Rule 1A:l(d) of the Virginia Supreme Court Rules,
effectively encouraged Virginia attorneys to reside in Virginia. 43 The Fourth

37. Id.
38. Id.; see supra note 31 (discussing origin of two-part privileges and immunities clause
analysis).
39. Friedman, 822 F.2d at 429; see supra note 31 (discussing origin of two-part privileges
and immunities clause analysis).
40. Friedman, 822 F.2d at 428. In deciding that courts can consider whether a state had
less restrictive means than discrimination by which to accomplish a state goal, the Friedman
court determined that Rule IA:I(c) was overbroad because Virginia, in attempting to achieve
Virginia's goal of genuine full-time Virginia practice for all Virginia bar members, discriminated
against nonresident attorneys without evidence that nonresident lawyers would be any more
likely than resident lawyers to be honest about their intention to practice full-time in Virginia.
Id. at 429; see supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (Virginia suggested that goal of
encouraging compliance with Rule IA:l(d)'s requirement of full-time practice in Virginia
justified Rule IA:1(c)'s discriminatory effect on nonresident attorneys). The Friedman court
suggested that a less restrictive means than preventing nonresidents from becoming members
of the Virginia bar would accomplish the valid goal of encouraging full-time Virginia practice
for all Virginia bar members. Friedman, 822 F.2d at 429.
41. Friedman, 822 F.2d at 429.
42. Id. According to the Friedman court, a rule requiring an attorney to commit yearly
to practicing law full-time in Virginia would place no additional burden on nonresidents of
Virginia, but would accomplish the state's goal of facilitating compliance with Rule 1A:1(d)
of the Virginia Supreme Court Rules. Id. at 429-30. The Friedman court reasoned that a rule
requiring an attorney to commit yearly to practicing law full-time in Virginia would encourage
compliance with Rule IA:l(d) because lawyers, for ethical reasons, more seriously would
commit to practicing law full-time in Virginia if they annually had to renew their promise to
adhere to Rule IA:1(d). Id.
43. Id. at 429. The Friedman court cited Goldfarb v. Supreme Court of Virginia to
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Circuit recognized that the full-time practice requirement of Rule IA:l(d)
necessitates that nonresidents live in locations convenient to their Virginia
legal practices. 44 The Friedman court concluded that Rule IA:l(d) achieves
Rule IA:l(c)'s goal of nonresident commitment to the practice of law in
Virginia without simultaneously violating the privileges and immunities of
nonresidents. 45 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit recommended that Virginia
require a yearly renewal of an attorney's affidavit attesting to the attorney's
maintenance of an office in Virginia.4 6 After explicating the alternatives that
are available to Virginia in achieving Virginia's goal of a committed and
competent bar, the Fourth Circuit determined that Virginia had not established a substantial relationship between its goals of improving the quality
of Virginia lawyers and encouraging full-time practice in Virginia and Rule
IA: l(c)'s discriminatory effect on nonresident attorneys. 47 Because the Friedman court determined that a substantial relationship between Virginia's
goals and Rule 1A:l(c)'s discriminatory effect did not exist, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that Virginia Rule 1A:l(c) violates the privileges and
immunities clause. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, affirmed the district
court's decision to grant Ms. Friedman's motion for summary judgment. 4
The Fourth Circuit's decision that Virginia Rule lA:1(c) violates the
privileges and immunities clause is consistent with the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Piper.49 In Piper the Supreme Court considered whether
the Rules of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, requiring that all
applicants for membership in the New Hampshire bar be residents of New
Hampshire, violated the privileges and immunities clause. 50 The Court in
Piper determined that the New Hampshire rule deprived nonresidents of
New Hampshire of the privilege of practicing law in New Hampshire on

support its conclusion that Rule 1A:l(d)'s full-time practice requirement does not discriminate
unfairly against nonresident attorneys. Id.; see Goldfarb v. Supreme Court of Va., 766 F.2d
859, 862-65 (4th Cir. 1985) (Rule IA:l(d) is not form of economic protectionism violating
commerce clause).
44. Friedman, 822 F.2d at 429-30.
45. Id. at 429; see supra note 43 (discussing Friedman court's reliance on Goldfarb v.

Supreme Court of Virginia in concluding that Rule 1A:l(d) does not violate privileges and
immunities clause).
46. See Friedman, 822 F.2d at 430 (yearly renewal of affidavits is less drastic means of
requiring full-time practice than residency requirement). Without explanation, the Friedman
court determined that, with the full-time practice requirement of Rule 1A:l(d), yearly renewal
of an attorney's affidavit attesting to the maintenance of a law office in Virginia was a less
restrictive means of encouraging genuine Virginia practice for all Virginia bar members than
Rule IA:1(c)'s residency requirement. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.

49. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's holding in
Piper).

50. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 276-77 (1985). In Piper the complaint
alleged that Rule 42 of the New Hampshire Supreme Court Rules, which required that applicants
to the New Hampshire bar either be residents of New Hampshire or file a statement of intent
to become a resident, violated the privileges and immunities clause. Id.
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the same terms as New Hampshire residents.51 The Supreme Court recognized
that the privileges and immunities clause guarantees the citizens of one state
the privilege of doing business in a second state on an equal basis with
citizens of the second state.52 The Court in Piper concluded that New
Hampshire had not demonstrated that a substantial reason existed for
excluding all nonresident attorneys from becoming members of the New
Hampshire bar.5 3 Although the Friedman court relied heavily on the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Piper, the Friedman court failed to recognize a crucial

distinction between the facts in Friedman and the facts in Piper.54 Although,
in Piper, the New Hampshire rules completely prohibited nonresidents of55
New Hampshire from becoming members of the New Hampshire bar,
Virginia Rule IA:I(c) completely did not prohibit nonresident attorneys
from practicing law in the state as members of the state bar.5 6 Rule 1A:I(c)
51. Id. at 280.
52. Id. In concluding that the privileges and immunities clause protects the privilege of
doing business, the Supreme Court in Piper deferred to its decision in Toomer v. Witsell. Id.;
see Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948) (privileges and immunities clause protects
citizen of State A's privilege of doing business in State B on same terms as citizen of State
B). Comparing the practice of law to occupations reviewed in previous cases, the Supreme
Court in Piper reasoned that the practice of law is vital to the national economy. Id. at 28081. The Court in Piper determined that lawyers, in addition to their importance to the
economy, also occupy an important noneconomic position in the United States because
nonresident lawyers often provide otherwise unavailable representation to parties with unpopular
claims. Id. at 281-82.
53. Piper, 470 U.S. at 288. In finding that New Hampshire unconstitutionally had
discriminated against nonresident attorneys, the Supreme Court in Piper determined that a
state may justify discrimination against nonresidents only by demonstrating that a substantial
state reason exists for the difference in treatment between residents and nonresidents of a
state. Id. at 284. The Piper court also established that a state must demonstrate a substantial
relationship between the discrimination and the state's purpose for the discrimination. Id. In
Piper the defendant, the state of New Hampshire, argued that nonresident members of the
New Hampshire bar generally would be less likely than New Hampshire residents to learn and
remain familiar with New Hampshire rules and procedure, to observe the New Hampshire
canon of ethics, to be accessible to New Hampshire court proceedings, and to do pro bono
work in New Hampshire. Id. at 285. The Court in Piper determined that New Hampshire
demonstrated neither a substantial reason for discriminating against nonresident lawyers nor a
substantial relationship between New Hampshire's purposes and discrimination against nonresident lawyers. Id. at 288.
54. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing crucial distinction between
Friedman and Piper).
55. N.H. Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule 42(3). The New Hampshire rule did not prevent completely
nonresidents from practicing law in New Hampshire. Id. The New Hampshire rules permitted
nonresident lawyers to practice in New Hampshire for a single case without becoming members
of the New Hampshire Bar. N.H. Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule 33(1). The Supreme Court in Piper,
however, determined that New Hampshire's requirement that an attorney reside in New
Hampshire to practice as a member of the New Hampshire bar violated the privileges and
immunities clause by preventifig nonresident lawyers from practicing within the state's borders
on the "same terms" as resident attorneys. Piper, 470 U.S. at 277 n.2; see infra note 74 and
accompanying text (discussing Piper's "same terms" interpretation of privileges and immunities
clause).
56. See Va. Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule 1A:I(c) (applicants for admission on motion to Virginia
bar must be permanent residents of Virginia).
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only prevented nonresidents of Virginia from becoming members of the
Virginia bar without taking the bar examination.5 7 This distinction between
Piper and Friedman raises the question of whether requiring nonresident
attorneys to take a bar examination substantially burdens nonresident attorneys and prevents nonresident attorneys from practicing law on the same
terms as resident attorneysA5 In determining whether requiring nonresident
attorneys to take a bar examination unfairly burdens nonresident attorneys,
the Friedman court recognized that the bar examination sufficiently burdened the free practice of law to prevent nonresidents from practicing law
in Virginia on the same terms as residents of Virginia. 59 Not all courts,
however, agree with the Fourth Circuit that a bar examination's burdens
on nonresidents violate the privileges and immunities clause. 60 For example,
in Sestric v. Clark,6' the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit considered whether an Illinois rule that prohibited both residents
and nonresidents of Illinois from practicing law in Illinois without taking
the Illinois bar examination violated the privileges and immunities clause. 62
Like the plaintiff in Friedman, the plaintiff in Sestric, an attorney who
lived outside the state, argued that the state rule prohibited nonresidents
from exercising their privilege of practicing law across state borders. 63 The
Sestric court distinguished between state rules involving "admission on

57. Id.
58. See Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 1985) (right to practice law without
taking bar examination is not "privilege" that privileges and immunities clause protects), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1086 (1986).
59. See Friedman v. Supreme Court of Va., 822 F.2d 423, 427 (4th Cir. 1987) (Rule
1A:I(c) is facially discriminatory against nonresident attorneys); supra notes 27, 29-30 and
accompanying text (discussing Friedman court's determination that Rule IA:I(c) imposes
facially discriminatory burden on nonresident attorneys).
60. See Sestric, 765 F.2d at 657 (state may not require attorneys to reside in state to
become members of state bar); infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (discussing Seventh
Circuit's reasoning in Sestric).
61. 765 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1985).
62. Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655, 656 (7th Cir. 1985). In Sestric v. Clark, in addition
to considering whether Illinois' residence requirement for admission on motion to the Illinois
bar violated the privileges and immunities clause, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit considered whether the Illinois rule requiring residency for admission on motion
violated the commerce clause and the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
Id. at 656-57.
63. Id. at 656. In Sestric under Rule 705 of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules (Rule 705),
the plaintiff could have become a member of the Illinois bar without taking the Illinois bar
examination if the plaintiff continuously had practiced for five of the last seven years as a
member of another state's bar. Id. at 657. The Illinois Supreme Court Rules required residents
of Illinois to take the Illinois bar examination before applying to Illinois' bar. Id. at 658. In
Sestric the plaintiff brought suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of
Illinois to invalidate Rule 705. See id. at 659 (discussing plaintiff's suit in district court). The
plaintiff alleged that Rule 705 violated the privileges and immunities clause. See id. (discussing
plaintiff's suit in district court). After the district court decided that Rule 705 did not violate
the privileges and immunities clause, Sestric appealed to the Seventh Circuit. See id. (discussing
district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint).
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examination," which require an attorney to reside in a state before seeking
admission to the state bar after taking the bar examination, and state rules

allowing "admission on motion," which require an attorney that does not
wish to take the bar examination to reside in the state before applying for
membership in the state bar. 64 The Sestric court acknowledged that a state

may not require residency as a prerequisite for membership in its state bar. 65
The Seventh Circuit, however, reasoned that a state rule that denies a
nonresident admission on motion does not absolutely prohibit the nonresi-

dent from becoming a member of the state bar. 66 The Sestric court determined that the rule denying a nonresident admission on motion only prevents
the nonresident from becoming a bar member without taking the bar
examination. 67 As a result, the Sestric court concluded that the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Piper did not apply68 to a state rule requiring residency

for admission to a state bar on motion.
Despite apparent similarities between the situation in Sestric and the
situation in Friedman, the state Supreme Court Rules in Sestric and Fried-

man differ in two significant ways. 69 For example, although the Virginia

rule prohibited Ms. Friedman from practicing law in Virginia on the same

64. Id. at 658. In Sestric.the Seventh Circuit determined that Rule 705, by requiring
attorneys to reside in Illinois for admission to the Illinois bar on examination, denied
nonresident attorneys the privilege of practicing law in Illinois. Id. The Sestric court, however,
determined that states which refuse to admit to their bars nonresident attorneys that do not
take the state's bar examination do not deny nonresident attorneys any constitutional privilege.
Id.
65. Sestric, 765 F.2d at 657. The Sestric court cited Supreme Court of New Hampshire
v. Piper in concluding that a state may not require attorneys to reside in a state to become
members of the state bar. Id.; see Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288 (1985)
(state rule requiring members of state bar to reside in state violated privileges and immunities
clause).
66. Sestric, 765 F.2d at 657.
67. Id. The Sestric court determined that Rule 705 completely did not deny admission
to the bar to nonresidents of Illinois. Id. Nonresidents could become members of the bar as
long as the nonresidents took and passed the Illinois bar examination. Id.
68. Id. at 658. The Sestric court suggested that the privilege of practicing law without
taking the bar examination is more similar to the privilege of pursuing a recreational sport
across state borders, which the privileges and immunities clause does not protect, than to the
privilege of practicing law, which the privileges and immunities clause does protect. Id.; see
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978) (state may discriminate
against nonresident elk hunters that do not reside in state because elk hunting is recreation,
not means of livelihood). The Sestric court compared bar membership without taking the bar
examination with recreational sport because the Sestric court reasoned that, like elk hunting,
the privilege of bar admission on motion is not "fundamental" to privileges and immunities
clause protection. Sestric, 765 F.2d at 658.
69. See infra notes 70-81 and accompanying text (discussing distinctions between Illinois
Supreme Court Rules in Sestric and Virginia Supreme Court Rules in Friedman);see Ill. Sup.
Ct. Rule 705 (only nonresidents that have practiced continuously for five of last seven years
in jurisdiction to whose bar they belong may join Illinois bar without taking and passing
Illinois bar examination); Va. Sup. Ct. Rule 1A:I (applicant to Virginia bar that resides in
Virginia and practices law full-time in Virginia may apply for admission to Virginia bar on
motion).
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terms as a Virginia resident, the Illinois rule did not prevent nonresidents
of Illinois from practicing law in Illinois on the same terms as an Illinois
resident. 70 Virginia Rule 1A:I, while permitting Virginia residents that meet
all of the rule's requirements to become members of the Virginia bar
without taking and passing the Virginia bar examination, requires nonresidents to take the bar examination. 71 The Illinois rule, in contrast, did not
prohibit the plaintiff in Sestric from practicing law in Illinois on the same
terms as most Illinois residents. 72 The Illinois rule denied both nonresidents
and all Illinois residents, except those new residents meeting the rule's
continuous practice exception, the right to become members of the Illinois
bar without taking the Illinois bar examination.7 3 The Supreme Court in
Piper decided that the privileges and immunities clause guarantees nonresident attorneys the right to practice law in a state on the same terms as a
state resident. 74 Even the Sestric court recognized that, if the Illinois rule
had prohibited nonresidents from applying for admission on motion but
allowed all Illinois residents to become members of the bar on motion, the
Illinois rule would have violated the privileges and immunities clause. 75
In addition to this difference between the Illinois and Virginia rules,
the Illinois and Virginia rules differ because, while the Virginia rule requires
76
attorneys to practice full-time in Virginia, the Illinois rule does not.

70. See infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text (discussing distinctions between Illinois
Supreme Court Rules and Virginia Supreme Court Rules).
71. Va. Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule 1A:I; see supra note 14 (discussing content of Rule 1A:I).
72. See Sestric, 765 F.2d at 658 (Illinois Rule 705 only deprived plaintiff nonresident
attorney of right, which only some state residents have, to become member of bar on motion).
73. Id. at 657; see Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 705 (only nonresidents that have practiced
continuously for five of last seven years in jurisdiction to whose bar they belong may join
Illinois bar without taking and passing Illinois bar examination); supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing content of Illinois Rule 705).
74. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 277 n.2 (1985). In Piper the New
Hampshire rules permitted the plaintiff nonresident attorney to practice law in the state only
for particular cases. Id. The Piper court emphasized that, although the rules did not completely
prevent the plaintiff from practicing law in New Hampshire, the New Hampshire rules did
prohibit the plaintiff from practicing law in New Hampshire on the same terms as attorneys
that resided in the state. Id. The Supreme Court in Piper determined that the plaintiff's
opportunity to practice in New Hampshire for single cases is not equivalent to a state resident's
ability to practice as a member of the state bar. Id. Adopting and expanding the Piper court's
reasoning, the Fourth Circuit in Friedmandetermined that a nonresident attorney's opportunity
to become a member of the state bar by taking the state bar examination is not equivalent to
a resident attorney's ability to become a member of the state bar without taking the bar
examination. Friedman v. Supreme Court of Va., 822 F.2d 423, 427 (4th Cir. 1987).
Other Supreme Court decisions interpreting the privileges and immunities clause support
the Piper court's broad "same terms" interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause.
See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868) (privileges and immunities clause places
citizens of each state upon same footing as citizens of other states); Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1873) (under privileges and immunities clause, states must extend
same rights that states grant to their own citizens to citizens of other states that cross states'
boundaries).
75. Sestric, 765 F.2d at 659.
76. Friedman, 822 F.2d at 428.
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Virginia's additional requirement that nonresident attorneys practice fulltime in Virginia increases the burden on nonresidents of practicing in
Virginia relative to the burden on residents.7 7 Unlike a nonresident of Illinois
applying for membership in the Illinois bar, a nonresident of Virginia
applying to the Virginia bar may not profit by maintaining practices in two
different states because the Virginia rules require him to practice full-time
in Virginia. 78 Virginia Rules 1A:1(c) and (d) insure that a nonresident
attorney suffers a greater net burden than a resident attorney suffers because,
while the burdens on resident and nonresident attorneys are in other respects
equal, the nonresident attorney must take the Virginia bar examination to
gain admission to the state bar.79 In contrast, a resident and nonresident of
Illinois both must take and pass the Illinois bar examination, but the
nonresident bears a lesser burden because he may maintain two practices. 0
The crucial distinctions between the situation in Sestric and the situation in
Friedman, therefore, outweigh the distinctions the Sestric court made between admission to state bars on motion and admission on examination
because, unlike Illinois, Virginia prohibits nonresident attorneys from practicing law in Virginia on the same terms as resident attorneys. 8'
Because the bar admission requirements in Friedman prohibited nonresidents from practicing law in Virginia on the same terms as residents and
because Rule lA:1(d) required nonresidents to maintain a full-time practice
in Virginia, the Friedman court correctly concluded that Virginia Rule
lA:I(c) violated the privileges and immunities clause. 82 Like the Friedman
court, at least one other court has determined that residency requirements
for admission on motion to a state bar violate the privileges and immunities

77. See id. (courts cannot infer that nonresident applicants seek to supplement established
practice in another state by becoming members of Virginia bar). The Sestric court reasoned
that Illinois' residency requirement does not burden nonresidents more than the state's residency
requirement burdens residents of Illinois. Sestric, 765 F.2d at 660. The Seventh Circuit suggested
that, although a nonresident of Illinois may maintain practices in two states and must pass
the Illinois bar examination, a new resident admitted to the Illinois bar on motion must
sacrifice one of his practices -to move to the state, become a resident, and establish a new
practice. Id. The Sestric court, therefore, reasoned that, in comparison to new residents,
nonresidents do not suffer a greater burden under the Illinois rule than all residents suffer.
Id. The Sestric court determined that the additional burden that Illinois Rule 705 places on
new residents suggested that Rule 705 did not discriminate against nonresidents in violation of
the privileges and immunities clause. See id. (Rule 705 does not produce obviously unreasonable
results by requiring nonresidents to take Illinois bar examination).
78. Friedman, 822 F.2d at 428; see supra note 77 (discussing Sestric court's comparison
of burdens that residency requirement for admission on motion places on nonresident attorneys
and on resident attorneys).
79. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text (Virginia Rule IA:I(c) significantly
differs from Illinois rule in Sestric).
80. Id.
81. See supra note 64 (discussing distinctions that Sestric court found between admission
on motion and admission on examination); supra notes 70-78 (discussing differences between
Sestric rule and Friedman rule).
82. See supranotes 70-78 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between Friedman
and Sestric).
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clause s8 In In re Jadd4 the Supreme Judicial Court for the state of
Massachusetts considered whether Massachusetts' requirement that nonresident attorneys pass the Massachusetts bar examination before becoming
members o( the Massachusetts bar violated the privileges and immunities
clause.8 In Jadd the plaintiff, a resident of New York, claimed that a
Massachusetts rule which required nonresident attorneys to take the Massachusetts bar examination before becoming members of the Massachusetts
bar violated the privileges and immunities clause. s6 After recognizing that
87
the privileges and immunities clause protects the privilege of practicing law,
the Jadd court considered whether the privileges and immunities clause gives

nonresident attorneys the right to practice law in Massachusetts without
taking the Massachusetts bar examination. 8 The Jadd court suggested that
new residents' admission on motion to the Massachusetts bar implied a lack
of state concern about potential Massachusetts bar members' insufficient
knowledge of Massachusetts law. s9 The Jadd court reasoned that, because

new residents could seek admission on motion, Massachusetts discriminated
against nonresident attorneys not because of their potential lack of knowl-

83. See infra notes 88-91 (discussing court's reasoning in In re Jadd).
84. 391 Mass. 227, 461 N.E.2d 760 (1984).
85. In re Jadd, 391 Mass. 227, -, 461 N.E.2d 760, 761 (1984).
86. Id. at

_

. 461 N.E.2d at 761. In In re Jadd the plaintiff lived in New York and

was a member of both the New York bar and Florida bar. Id. The plaintiff in Jadd filed a
request for a special hearing before one justice of the Supreme Judicial court for the state of
Massachusetts to determine the question of the constitutionality of a Massachusetts rule
requiring residency for admission on motion. Id. The justice to whom the plaintiff made his
request brought the issue before the entire Supreme Judicial Court. Id.
87. Id. at _
461 N.E.2d at 762. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
decided In re Jadd before the United States Supreme Court in Supreme Court of New

Hampshire v. Piper determined that the privileges and immunities clause protects the practice
of law. Id. The Jadd court cited the United States District Court decision in Piperand several
state cases to support its conclusion that the privileges and immunities clause protects the
practice of law. Id. at -, 461 N.E.2d at 762-63; see Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470
U.S. 274 (1985) (privileges and immunities clause protects privilege of practicing law).
88. Jadd, 391 Mass. at....

461 N.E.2d at 765-66. The Jadd court reviewed possibly

substantial state reasons for discriminating against nonresident attorneys. Id. at -, 461
N.E.2d at 764-65. The Jadd court considered the state's arguments that residency in a state
indicates familiarity with the state's legal practice and evidences an attorney's desire to learn
state procedure. Id. The Jadd court also considered whether a residency requirement significantly simplifies the service of process and whether court appearances are more difficult if a
state's attorneys reside outside the state's borders. Id. Last, the Jadd court considered whether
requiring an attorney to reside in the state in which he practices aids in investigating the
background of the attorney. Id. The Jadd court rejected all of the state's justifications for
discriminating against nonresident attorneys and proposed possibilities less drastic than a
residency requirement for meeting the same objectives. Id.
89. Id. at _,

461 N.E.2d at 766. The Massachusettsrule in Jadd allowed all residents,

even new residents, to apply for admission on motion to the Massachusetts bar. Id. The Jadd
court reasoned that Massachusetts, in permitting new residents to become members of the
state bar without taking the bar examination, contradicted Massachusetts' concern that its
attorneys must be familiar with Massachusetts law. Id.
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edge, but solely because of their lack of residence in Massachusetts." The
Jadd court concluded that Massachusetts' residency requirement for attorneys that wish to practice law in Massachusetts without taking the Massachusetts bar examination violated the rights of all nonresident attorneys to
practice law in Massachusetts on equal terms with resident attorneys. 91 The
Jadd court's reasoning applies directly to Friedman because, in both Friedman and Jadd, state rules prohibited nonresident attorneys from practicing
law in the state on the same terms as resident attorneys. 92 Like the Massachusetts rule in Jadd, Virginia Rule lA:1 permitted new residents to join

the Virginia bar without taking the Virginia bar examination, but required
nonresidents to take and pass the bar examination before joining the Virginia
bar.9 Like the Friedman court, the Jadd court concluded that a state rule

prohibiting nonresidents from practicing law in"another state on the same
terms as residents of that state violates the privileges and immunities clause
guarantee that the citizens of each state will enjoy the privileges of the

citizens of all other states.In addition to the similarities between the reasonings of the Jadd court

and the Friedman court, the practical implications of the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Friedman suggest that the Fourth Circuit correctly determined
that states should not be able to base admission on motion to state bars
on residency in the state.95 If states could discriminate against nonresidents,

attorneys that live only a few miles over the border of a state unfairly
would encounter obstacles to bar membership in that state simply because
they did not reside in the state.9 6 Under the Friedman decision, however,

attorneys that live in Maryland or Washington, D.C., only a few miles
from Virginia, can enjoy bar membership on the same terms as Virginia
residents. 97 Although at least one authority has suggested that nonresident

90. Id. Like the Fourth Circuit in Friedman, the Jadd court determined that the state
residency requirement was facially discriminatory. See Friedman v. Supreme Court of Va.,
822 F.2d 423, 426-27 (4th Cir. 1987) (Virginia Rule 1A:l(c) facially discriminated against
nonresident attorneys because Rule IA:I(c) burdened nonresidents solely because nonresidents
did not reside in state); In re Jadd, 391 Mass. 227, , 461 N.E.2d 760, 766 (1984)
(Massachusetts rule facially discriminated against nonresident attorneys, not because of lack
of legal knowledge, but because of lack of residence in Massachusetts).
91. Jadd, 391 Mass. at -, 461 N.E.2d at 766.
92. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (discussing Jadd court's reasoning and
holding); supra notes 20-48 and accompanying text (discussing Friedman court's reasoning and
holding).
93. See supra notes 14, 71 and accompanying text (discussing effect of Rule 1A:l(c) on
both residents and nonresidents of Virginia who meet all other requirements of Rule 1A:I).
94. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (discussing Jadd court's reasoning and
conclusions).
95. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (discussing practical implications of
Friedman court's holding).
96. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties that Virginia Rule
1A:l(c) posed to plaintiff in Friedman, who always had lived and practiced in or near
Washington, D.C.).
97. Id.
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attorneys' distant locations from state courthouses might cause uncertainty
and delay in court business,9" Virginia Rule 1A:l(d)'s requirement that
Virginia bar members practice full-time in Virginia reduces this risk. 99 If an
attorney residing outside Virginia's borders must spend his work day in
Virginia, the attorney is both less'likely to live a great distance from his
work location and less likely to be inaccessible to Virginia courts.'l ° As a
result, Rule 1A:1(d) eliminates any threat to the efficient practice of law in
Virginia that nonresidence of Virginia bar members might pose.
In Friedman, the Fourth Circuit determined that, under the privileges
and immunities clause, states cannot require nonresident attorneys to take
a state bar examination before practicing in the state, if the state allows
resident attorneys to practice law in the state without taking the bar
examination and if the burden that the state imposes on nonresidents exceeds
the burden on residents. 0 1 Although the Friedman court departed from the
reasoning of at least one other circuit, the Friedman court correctly relied
on the Supreme Court's analysis in Piper in concluding that Virginia could
not base admission on motion to the state bar on state residency.'0 2 By
allowing nonresident lawyers to practice law in Virginia on the same terms
as lawyers that are Virginia residents, 103 the Friedman court prohibits the
state from discriminating against nonresident attorneys. Additionally, the
conclusion of at least one other court that a state cannot base admission
on motion to the state bar on state residency supports the soundness of the
Friedman court's holding.'04 Finally, the practical implications of the Friedman holding indicate its usefulness and applicability.0 5 Because of the
Fourth Circuit's application of the Supreme Court's holding in Piper, the
price of the Virginia bar is no longer too great for nonresidents of Virginia.
MELISSA

J.

HALsTEAD-W ITE

98. See Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 296 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (state should be able to require members of state bar to reside in state to avoid

uncertainties and delays that distantly located counsel cause).
99. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (discussing content and effect of Rule
1A:1(d)).
100. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (discussing effect of Rule IA:l(d) on
attorneys that wish to maintain multi-state practices).
101. See supra notes 20-48 and accompanying text (discussing Friedman court's holding
and reasoning).
102. Id.; see supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (discussing Sestric court's holding
and reasoning).
103. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing Piper court's "same terms"
analysis of privileges and immunities clause).
104. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (discussing Jadd court's holding and

reasoning).
105. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (discussing discriminatory effects of
Rule IA:l(c)); supra notes 87-91 (discussing Jadd court's holding); supra notes 95-100 (discussing practical implications of Friedman court's holding).
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ADDENDUM

The United States Supreme Court recently reviewed the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Friedman v. Supreme Court of Virginia. In Supreme Court of
Virginia v. Friedman, 108 S. Ct. 2260 (1988), the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's holding that Rule 1A:l(c) violated the
privileges and immunities clause. Id. at 2265. The Supreme Court in
Friedman determined that by requiring nonresident applicants to the Virginia
bar to take the bar examination while allowing residents of Virginia to
become members of the Virginia bar without taking the bar examination,
Virginia failed under Piper to allow nonresidents of Virginia to practice law
in Virginia on substantially equal terms with Virginia resident attorneys. Id.
Additionally, in determining that Virginia had presented no substantial
reasons for discriminating against nonresident attorneys, the Supreme Court
noted that by requiring applicants to the Virginia bar to maintain a fulltime practice in Virginia, Rule 1A:l(d) ensured that nonresident attorneys
will maintain a sufficient interest in Virginia law. Id. at 2266. Consequently,
the Supreme Court concluded that Virginia had failed to justify Rule
1A:1(c)'s discriminatory effect on nonresident attorneys. Id.

